Emerging Circuit Split Over Modification of Mortgages on Multi-use Real Properties by Zabadal, Michal
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 
Volume 26 Issue 2 Article 5 
2021 
Emerging Circuit Split Over Modification of Mortgages on Multi-
use Real Properties 
Michal Zabadal 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Bankruptcy Law Commons, Secured Transactions 
Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michal Zabadal, Emerging Circuit Split Over Modification of Mortgages on Multi-use Real Properties, 26 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 444 (2021). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law by an authorized editor 




EMERGING CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER 
MODIFICATION OF MORTGAGES ON MULTI-
USE REAL PROPERTIES 
Michal Zabadal* 
ABSTRACT 
For many decades, healthy levels of residential mortgage loans 
(“RMLs”) and their regulation have been among the major drivers of 
the economy. Because of the importance of RMLs for the condition 
of the national financial system and the general well-being of the 
society, it is essential that lenders are reasonably incentivized to 
originate these loans. A well-designed promise of higher recovery on 
RMLs in times of distress can be a compelling motivator. The 
Bankruptcy Code seeks to deliver on that promise by treating RMLs 
more favorably. It does that by barring the debtor-in-bankruptcy 
from modifying a claim secured by a mortgage on real property that 
represents the principal residence of the debtor. 
The modification of a general secured claim may come in many 
flavors. Most potently, it can take the form of bifurcation of an 
under-secured claim into two portions: one, equal to the value of the 
property securing it; and second, for the remainder of the original 
claim. It is the second portion that will, following such bifurcation, 
be treated as an unsecured claim. As a result, the recovery on the 
unsecured portion will commonly be only cents on the dollar. 
Creditors whose RMLs are secured by the principal residence of the 
debtor enjoy protection from bifurcation, and, consequently, achieve 
higher recovery on their claims. 
At first glance, the condition for the application of the anti-
modification protection is straightforward—the claim must be 
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Prague, School of Law, 2018. I would like to thank Professor Susan Block-Lieb for 
introducing me to the world of bankruptcy and for her invaluable insights and guidance 
throughout this Note. I would like to also thank the editors and staff of the Fordham 
Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for their help in the editing process. Finally, a 
special thank you to my wife Meagan and my family for all their support and 
encouragement throughout law school. 
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secured only by real property that is the principal residence of the 
debtor. Unfortunately, many complexities have arisen out of 
attempts to determine what constitutes one’s principal residence in 
this context. Is any real property where the debtor principally resides 
the debtor’s principal residence, even though the debtor 
simultaneously runs a business on the property or rents a portion of 
the property to a third party? Alternatively, does the debtor have to 
use the property exclusively as her principal residence for the claim 
to qualify for the anti-modification protection? Viewed from yet 
another perspective, does it matter whether the parties to a particular 
mortgage transaction intended to provide the debtor with a home or a 
source of income? As different courts embraced the question of what 
constitutes the debtor’s principal residence differently, three distinct 
interpretive approaches arose. 
This Note begins with a survey of the relevant interpretive 
approaches. It then advocates for the adoption of an approach that, in 
the author’s opinion, best enables the Bankruptcy Code to deliver on 
its promise and to achieve the ultimate purpose of the anti-
modification protection—encouraging the flow of capital into the 
RML market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an economic crisis, individuals and businesses increasingly turn 
to the bankruptcy system asking for relief to help them navigate times of 
financial distress.1 Historically, bankruptcy filings closely tracked 
unemployment rates.2 While that correlation has been reversed during 
the COVID-19 pandemic so far,3 the American Bankruptcy Institute 
predicts that filings will sharply increase in the years to come.4 
If and when that happens, many individuals will resort to 
bankruptcy in an effort to save their homes.5 On its face, the Bankruptcy 
Code provides a potentially significant tool that may be utilized by 
debtors to achieve that goal—bifurcation of a claim secured by a 
mortgage on real property.6 
 
 1. Jialan Wang, Jeyul Yang, Benjamin Iverson & Raymond Kluender, Bankruptcy 
and the COVID-19 Crisis, 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper 21-041, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3690398 [https://perma.cc/E2LV-
JG2W]. 
 2. Id. at 2. 
 3. Id. at 14. According to weekly filing data compiled by the American 
Bankruptcy Institute from PACER, total bankruptcy filings since March 2020 were 
consistently lower throughout the year, by approximately 40% compared to the same 
weeks in 2019. Ed Flynn, Weekly Bankruptcy Analysis: November 23–29, 2020, AM. 
BANKR. INST. (Nov. 21, 2020, 5:42 PM), https://www.abi.org/covid-19/weekly-reports 
[https://perma.cc/298N-Z8C3]. While Chapter 11 filings were generally up throughout 
the period, the overwhelming majority of filings comprised of Chapter 7 and Chapter 
13 cases which were experiencing sharp drops in filing rates. Id.; see also Wang, Yang, 
Iverson & Kluender, supra note 1, at 11–13 (attributing the decrease in filings to the 
initial bankruptcy court shutdowns and outbreaks, social distancing policies and 
changes in court procedures, liquidity constraints, uncertainty regarding the availability 
of federal aid, federal, state, and local moratoria imposed on evictions and foreclosures, 
massive federal aid packages, and other forms of relief implemented by localities and 
industry participants). 
 4. Q & A: Will Bankruptcy Filings Reach Record Levels?, AM. BANKR. INST. 
(Dec. 22, 2020, 2:27 PM), https://s3.amazonaws.com/abi-org-
corp/covid19/documents/Bankruptcy%20Filings.pdf [https://perma.cc/38N9-SP3H] 
(expecting a sharp increase in filings in the next few years, and explaining that the 
current filing drop is attributable to the surge in unemployment which caused millions 
of Americans to lose regular income needed to fund a Chapter 13 plan). 
 5. Richard S. Gendler, Home Mortgage Cramdown in Bankruptcy, 22 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 329, 330–31 (2014). 
 6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 1123(b)(5), 1190(3), 1322(b)(2); see also Gendler, supra 
note 5, at 333 (referencing bifurcation or “cramdown” as the most significant type of 
claim modification). 
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If the value of the mortgaged property is less than the face amount 
of the claim the mortgage secures, the debtor may have the right, in 
a subsequent bankruptcy case, to bifurcate the claim into a secured 
portion equal to the value of the property, and an unsecured portion for 
the remainder.7 In most cases, this effectively reduces—sometimes 
significantly—the total amount of payments the debtor must make on 
account of that claim under her reorganization plan.8 As a result, the 
debtor increases her chances to keep the encumbered property and 
achieve a “fresh start.”9 
Unfortunately, the debtor’s efforts to save her home by means of 
bifurcation reach a dead end when the claim is secured by a mortgage on 
real property that is the “debtor’s principal residence.”10 When that is 
the case, any bifurcation of the claim is prohibited by the anti-
modification provisions of Title 11 of the United States Code (the 
“Bankruptcy Code”).11 
But what real properties constitute the “debtor’s principal 
residence” within the sense of the anti-modification provisions? Does 
the subject property have to be used exclusively as the debtor’s principal 
residence for the anti-modification provisions to apply? Or do the 
provisions apply also to mixed-use real property—that is, property used 
by the debtor as her principal residence, as well as for additional 
purposes? Courts have repeatedly struggled with this question. 
Take, for example, a debtor who takes out a loan to acquire a two-
family dwelling and secures the loan by a mortgage on the property. The 
debtor moves in and begins to principally reside in one of the units. 
Further, to help the debtor pay-off the loan, she decides to rent out the 
second unit to a tenant. As a result, the debtor now uses the property in 
part as her principal residence, and in part as rental property. Another 
debtor principally resides in a different single- or multi-unit property, 
and, without renting a portion of the property to a third party, 
simultaneously uses part of the property to run a home business. 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. For more detailed discussion of this point, see infra notes 28–33 and 
accompanying text. 
 9. See Gendler, supra note 5, at 405 (highlighting “fresh start” as one of the main 
goals the United States bankruptcy system is designed to assist debtors to achieve). 
 10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1322(b)(2). 
 11. Id. 
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Do the above properties represent the debtor’s principal residence? 
Does it matter whether the underlying mortgage agreement also created 
a security interest in rents, or, more broadly speaking, income generated 
from the property? In escrow funds and insurance proceeds pertaining to 
the property? And, if the use of the subject property by the debtor 
matters, should the court consider the manner in which the debtor used 
the property as of the loan-origination date, or the date of the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition? 
If the predictions regarding the surge of personal bankruptcies in 
the following years come true, these questions will likely be once again 
occupying the court system and litigants. For this reason, this Note 
attempts to propose some sensible answers. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the right of a debtor-in-
bankruptcy to modify a mortgage on her home and discusses the 
evolution of the anti-modification provisions from the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code in 1978 to the present day. Part II surveys three 
interpretive approaches to the question of what constitutes a debtor’s 
principal residence. Finally, Part III proposes the adoption of an 
approach which, in the author’s opinion, is the most faithful to the 
language of the Bankruptcy Code as well as the purpose of the anti-
modification provisions. 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Bankruptcy Code defines a “claim” as the right to (i) any 
payment, or (ii) an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such 
breach gives rise to payment.12 A claim that is (i) allowed under § 502, 
and (ii) secured by a “lien” on property is a “secured claim” to the extent 
of the value of the property.13 To the extent such allowed claim exceeds 
the value of the property, it is an “unsecured claim.”14 A “lien” is 
defined as “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a 
debt or performance of an obligation.”15 Accordingly, a “holder of a 
secured claim” is a creditor entitled to performance owed by the debtor 
with respect to such secured claim.16 
 
 12. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). 
 13. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). 
 14. Id. 
 15. 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). 
 16. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(10), 506(a)(1). 
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A. THE MODIFICATION RIGHT IN GENERAL 
Subject to the limitation discussed below, a debtor’s reorganization 
plan may propose to “modify” the rights of “holders of secured 
claims.”17 Modification represents “any fundamental alteration in a 
debtor’s obligations.”18 It may take the form, for example, of a reduction 
of monthly payments,19 extension of the repayment period,20 amendment 
of the payment schedule,21 alteration of the nature or rate of interest,22 
or, most significantly, bifurcation of a claim of an “undersecured 
creditor.”23 A creditor is undersecured when it holds an allowed claim 
secured by a lien on property, the value of which is less than the amount 
of such claim.24 
Bifurcation represents the most significant form of modification.25 
Upon bifurcation, the original claim gets split into two portions—
a secured portion equal in amount to the value of the collateral, and an 
unsecured portion for the remainder.26 Bifurcation effectively reduces 
the amount the debtor has to repay to achieve a “fresh start.”27 
For example, in a typical consumer case28 administered under 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, the holder of a bifurcated claim is 
entitled to receive a stream of payments with a value equal to the present 
 
 17. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1190(3), 1322(b)(2). 
 18. Cf. In re Litton, 330 F.3d 636, 643 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 19. Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Ass’n, 730 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 20. In re Gwinn, 34 B.R. 936, 944 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983). 
 21. In re Cooper, 98 B.R. 294, 299 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989). 
 22. In re Coffey, 52 B.R. 54, 55 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1985). 
 23. In re Schum, 112 B.R. 159, 160 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990). 
 24. The Bankruptcy Code does not use the term “undersecured creditor.” Instead, it 
uses the term “creditor” or “holder of a claim”—whether secured or unsecured. Yet, the 
term “undersecured creditor” has emerged to refer to a creditor whose claim, secured 
under the applicable non-bankruptcy law, gets split into a secured and unsecured 
portion in bankruptcy by virtue of the operation of § 506(a)(1) discussed below. See 11 
U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). 
 25. Gendler, supra note 5, at 333. 
 26. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). 
 27. See Gendler, supra note 5, at 405. 
 28. More precisely, eligibility for Chapter 13 is limited to “individuals with regular 
income” who satisfy certain debt limits. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). An “individual” is an 
undefined term. It refers to a natural person and represents a sub-category of a broader, 
defined term “person.” See 11 U.S.C. § 101(41). The Bankruptcy Code does not use the 
term “consumer.” In some circumstances, however, it does use the term “consumer 
debt.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(8). 
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value of the secured portion of the claim.29 On account of the unsecured 
portion of the claim, however, that same creditor is entitled to receive a 
pro rata share of the greater of (i) the amount general unsecured 
creditors would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation of the debtor;30 or 
(ii) the debtor’s projected disposable income in the applicable 
commitment period.31 In effect, because unsecured creditors usually 
receive only cents on the dollar,32 bifurcation frequently results in 
a significant reduction of the payments to be made by the debtor under 
a confirmed plan when compared to the payments the debtor would have 
to make had she not filed for bankruptcy.33 
Modification must be distinguished from a “cure” of a claim.34 A 
cure “reinstates a debt to its pre-default position, or it returns the debtor 
and creditor to their respective positions before the default.”35 
Distinguishing between a cure and a modification bears a significant 
practical relevance. While a debtor has the right to cure just about any 
claim,36 the debtor cannot modify a claim secured solely by a mortgage 
on her home.37 
This limitation is imposed by the anti-modification provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code.38 The provisions deny a debtor the right to modify 
“a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is 
the debtor’s principal residence . . . .”39 
The anti-modification provisions prohibit a debtor from bifurcating 
even a claim of an undersecured creditor that would otherwise get 
 
 29. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). 
 30. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). 
 31. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). 
 32. Adam J. Levitin & Joshua Goodman, The Effect of Bankruptcy Strip-Down on 
Mortgage Markets 2 (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Research Paper No. 1087816, 2008). 
 33. See id. (stressing that the significance of bifurcation follows from the fact that 
it “affects the treatment of the principal amount of the creditor’s claim, not just the 
interest.”). 
 34. Sections 1123(a)(5)(G) and 1322(b)(3) allow a debtor, in the plan of 
reorganization, to provide for the “curing or waiving of any default.” 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1123(a)(5)(G), 1322(b)(3). 
 35. In re Litton, 330 F.3d 636, 644 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 36. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(5)(G), 1322(b)(3). 
 37. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1322(b)(2). 
 38. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1322(b)(2). The anti-modification provisions of 
Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 contain virtually identical wording. Accordingly, each 
reference, analysis, or conclusion pertaining to either of these provisions found in this 
Note is equally applicable to both. 
 39. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5). 
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bifurcated by virtue of the application of § 506(a).40 In this respect, the 
anti-modification provisions operate as special provisions suspending 
the general treatment of claims of undersecured creditors under 
§ 506(a).41 
Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, Congress has 
revisited the anti-modification provisions several times to add specificity 
to this language. The emerging circuit split that is the subject of this 
Note involves decisions rendered over time which considered distinct 
statutory language of the Bankruptcy Code. These statutory amendments 
may implicate courts’ rationales in some of these decisions. To 
determine the continued applicability of these decisions under the 
current state of the Bankruptcy Code, I consider it critical to analyze 
each of the relevant decisions in its historical context as relates to 
the statutory language in existence at the time of the issuance of the 
opinion. Accordingly, in the following subsection, I provide 
an overview of the legislative history of the development of the anti-
modification provisions. 
B. THE ANTI-MODIFICATION PROVISIONS: FROM THE INCEPTION OF 
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE TO THE PRESENT DAY 
In 1978, Congress enacted the “Act to Establish a Uniform Law on 
the Subject of Bankruptcies,” which became known as the Bankruptcy 
Code.42 Since its inception, the Bankruptcy Code contained the anti-
modification provision set out in § 1322(b)(2).43 The provision enables a 
debtor to “modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a 
claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the 
debtor’s principal residence . . . .”44 The language of the provision 
remained unchanged since the Bankruptcy Code’s enactment. 
 
 40. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 506(a). 
 41. See id.; see also Gendler, supra note 5, at 378–79: 
Section 506(a) deals merely with a claim’s classification, not with its treatment 
once classified. Once a claim is classified its treatment is determined under the 
pertinent Code sections . . . . It is the modification of the creditor’s rights and not 
the classification of his or her claim that is protected under [the anti-modification 
provisions]. 
 42. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. 
 43. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2); Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. 
 44. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
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Over a decade later, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1994,45 amending the Bankruptcy Code to provide for a virtually 
identical counterpart of the modification right to debtors whose cases are 
being administered under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.46 
Since the insertion of both anti-modification provisions in 
the Bankruptcy Code, the operational language of the provisions has 
remained unchanged. What did subsequently change, however, 
is the specificity with which the Bankruptcy Code defined the core term 
in the provisions: the “debtor’s principal residence.”47 Since its 
enactment in 1978, the Bankruptcy Code had not defined the term. It 
remained undefined, despite amendments enacted in 1994 to extend the 
application of the anti-modification standard from Chapter 13 to Chapter 
11 plan confirmation. Instead, courts construing the phrase during this 
period implicitly supplied their own definition of “debtor’s principal 
residence,” relying either on close textual analysis or proclamation of 
legislative intent.48 
Congress stepped in to add an express definition of the term in the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(“BAPCPA”).49 BAPCPA defined a debtor’s principal residence as: 
(A) mean[ing] a residential structure, including incidental property, 
without regard to whether that structure is attached to real property; 
and (B) includ[ing] an individual condominium or cooperative unit, 
a mobile or manufactured home, or trailer . . . .50 
BAPCPA further explicated the definition of debtor’s principal 
residence by separately defining “incidental property” as: 
[M]ean[ing], with respect to a debtor’s principal residence[,] (A) 
property commonly conveyed with a principal residence in the area 
where the real property is located; (B) all easements, rights, 
appurtenances, fixtures, rents, royalties, mineral rights, oil or gas 
 
 45. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994). 
 46. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5); Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 206, 108 Stat. 4106; see also In 
re Scarborough, 461 F.3d 406, 413 (3d Cir. 2006) (“With the addition of this provision, 
Congress sought to ‘conform[] the treatment of residential mortgages in [C]hapter 11 to 
that in [C]hapter 13.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 835, at 46 (1994)). 
 47. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1322(b)(2). 
 48. See, e.g., Scarborough, 461 F.3d at 411 (relying on textual analysis); Lomas 
Mortg., Inc. v. Louis, 82 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1996) (resorting to legislative history). 
 49. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
 50. Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 306(c)(1), 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(13A)). 
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rights or profits, water rights, escrow funds, or insurance proceeds; 
and (C) all replacements or additions . . . .51 
Both definitions introduced by BAPCPA are applicable to cases 
filed after October 17, 2005.52 While the definition of incidental 
property has remained unchanged since its enactment, Congress revised 
the definition of a debtor’s principal residence with the Bankruptcy 
Technical Corrections Act of 2010 (“BTCA”).53 
The BTCA inserted a qualifier in both subsections of the definition 
of a debtor’s principal residence. This qualifying language specifies that 
the residential structure in question must actually be “used as the 
principal residence by the debtor” to meet the definition’s criteria.54 The 
BTCA became effective on December 22, 2010, and, unlike the 
BAPCPA, does not contain provisions addressing the temporal scope of 
its applicability.55 Since the BTCA, the definition of debtor’s principal 
residence has not been further amended. 
Upon inserting the current wording of the definition of the debtor’s 
principal residence into the language of the anti-modification provisions, 
the provisions should be read as follows: 
[The debtor cannot modify] a claim secured only by a security 
interest in real property that: 
(A) [is] a residential structure if used as the principal 
residence by the debtor, including incidental property, 
without regard to whether that structure is attached to real 
property; and 
(B) includes an individual condominium or cooperative 
unit, a mobile or manufactured home, or trailer if used as 
the principal residence by the debtor.56 
 
 51. Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 306(c)(2), 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(27A)). 
 52. Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1501(a), (b), 119 Stat. 23. 
 53. Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 3557 (2010). 
 54. Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 3557 (codified at 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(13A)) (emphasis added). 
 55. Pub. L. No. 111-327, 124 Stat. 3557. 
 56. Combining the language of 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1322(b)(2), and 
101(13A). 
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The following section analyzes the relevant case law and draws 
conclusions in view of the historical context outlined above. 
II. DEVELOPING CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE MEANING OF THE 
DEBTOR’S PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE 
Courts have developed three distinct interpretive approaches to the 
treatment of claims secured only by a security interest in mixed-use real 
property owned by an individual. First, some courts hold that the anti-
modification provisions apply only to real property that is used by an 
individual debtor exclusively as a principal residence (the “Residential-
Use-Only Approach”).57 Second, other courts apply the anti-
modification provisions to real property that has been intended by the 
parties to be used primarily as residential property (the “Case-by-Case 
Approach”).58 Finally, contrary to the Residential-Use-Only Approach, 
some courts hold that the anti-modification provisions apply to real 
property that is used by the debtor as her principal residence, even if 
the property is also used for additional, non-residential purposes (the 
“Mixed-Use Approach”).59 Each of the approaches is addressed in more 
detail below. 
A. THE RESIDENTIAL-USE-ONLY APPROACH: THE ANTI-MODIFICATION 
PROVISIONS APPLY ONLY TO REAL PROPERTY USED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE 
DEBTOR AS A PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE 
Courts that adopted the Residential-Use-Only Approach refuse to 
extend the anti-modification protection to any claim that is secured by a 
security interest in real property that is not used by the debtor 
exclusively as her principal residence. This approach appears to 
represent the majority rule.60 Although courts in this category reach the 
same conclusion, they arrive at this holding by following distinct 
rationales. 
 
 57. See infra Section II.A. 
 58. See infra Section II.B. 
 59. See infra Section II.C. 
 60. In re Krus, 582 B.R. 218, 221 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2018) (referring to the first 
approach as the “majority rule”); In re Moorer, 544 B.R. 702, 705 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 
2016) (same). 
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1. Congressional Intent: The Anti-Modification Provisions Are 
Ambiguous 
Some courts find the text of the anti-modification provisions 
ambiguous and, by resorting to legislative history, resolve this 
ambiguity to require exclusively residential use.61 These courts find 
ambiguity both before and after the enactment of the BAPCPA and the 
BTCA. 
Pre-BAPCPA and BTCA, the mortgagee in Lomas Mortgage, Inc. 
v. Louis held a security interest in a three-family home, with the debtors 
principally residing in one unit, the second unit occupied by a relative of 
the debtors, and the third unit rented to a third party.62 
The First Circuit acknowledged two plausible constructions of the 
anti-modification provisions.63 Under one interpretation, the term “only” 
in the text of the provisions requires that the collateral in issue is 
comprised solely of real property, as opposed to personal property or the 
combination of real and personal property.64 Alternatively, a narrower 
interpretation would read the term “only” in conjunction with the verb 
“is” to require “complete and exclusive identity between ‘real property’ 
and ‘principal residence.’”65 
Because the court found the text of the provisions inconclusive, it 
resorted to legislative history.66 The court found that while legislative 
history “does tend to show that with § 1322(b)(2) Congress wanted to 
benefit the residential mortgage market as opposed to the entire real 
estate mortgage market . . . the legislative history does not state with 
clarity how a mortgage on a mixed property . . . should be treated.”67 
Seeking additional guidance, the court examined legislative history 
of § 1123(b)(5)—Chapter 11’s virtually identical counterpart to the anti-
modification provision of Chapter 13.68 The Lomas court found in the 
legislative history references to cases where the anti-modification 
 
 61. E.g., Lomas Mortg., Inc. v. Louis, 82 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1996); In re Abrego, 
506 B.R. 509, 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014). 
 62. Lomas, 82 F.3d at 2. 
 63. See id. at 4. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 5. 
 68. Id. at 6. 
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provision should not apply, including In re Ramirez.69 In Ramirez, the 
court permitted modification of a claim secured by a mortgage on real 
property consisting of the debtor’s principal residence and two rental 
units.70 
Additionally, as a matter of policy, the Lomas court was concerned 
that extending the anti-modification protection to multi-unit dwellings 
would create a “difficult line-drawing problem.”71 The court noted that 
“[i]t is unlikely Congress intended the anti-modification provision to 
reach a 100-unit apartment complex simply because the debtor lives in 
one of the units.”72 Thus, it concluded, “[l]imiting the anti-modification 
provision to single-family dwellings creates a more easily administered 
test.”73 
Based on the foregoing, the Lomas court found a “clear expression 
of congressional intent” that the anti-modification provisions do not 
apply to multi-unit properties, and permitted the modification sought by 
the debtors.74 
Post-BAPCPA and BTCA, the court in Abrego also concluded that 
the anti-modification provisions are ambiguous.75 The Abrego court 
sided with the First Circuit’s reasoning that, “while the legislative 
history of § 1322(b)(2) is not helpful, this court agrees with Lomas that 
the legislative history to § 1123(b)(5) is instructive,” and found 
analogous facts to those of Ramirez.76 Thus, the court in Abrego 
similarly held that the anti-modification provisions do not apply to 
multi-unit dwellings.77 It also held that the loan origination date is 
the relevant moment at which the nature of the real property in question 
shall be determined.78 Given that as of the origination of the affected 
mortgage the debtors had rented part of the subject property, the court 
allowed modification.79 
 
 69. Id. (citing In re Ramirez, 62 B.R. 668 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986)). 
 70. Ramirez, 62 B.R. at 668. 
 71. Lomas, 82 F.3d at 6. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 7. 
 75. In re Abrego, 506 B.R. 509, 514 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See generally id. Interestingly, the Abrego court reached its conclusion without 
ever considering, at least in the text of the opinion, the changes introduced by the 
BAPCPA and the BTCA. 
 78. Id. at 516. 
 79. Id. 
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2. Textual Analysis: The Anti-Modification Provisions Are 
Unambiguous 
Some courts have adopted the Residential-Use-Only Approach by 
relying primarily on textual analysis of the anti-modification provisions, 
finding them unambiguous. These courts find sufficient clarity in the 
text of the provisions both before and after the enactment of the 
BAPCPA and the BTCA. 
In re Scarborough is an example of a pre-BAPCPA80 and BTCA 
decision following textual analysis. In Scarborough, the Third Circuit 
addressed whether the anti-modification provisions extend to multi-unit 
dwellings.81 In that case, the mortgaged property was a two-story 
residence—the debtor lived downstairs and rented the second-floor 
apartment to a tenant.82 
First, the Scarborough court analyzed whether the subject property 
must be used by the debtor exclusively as a principal residence for 
the anti-modification protection to attach.83 The court focused on 
the presence of the verb “is” in the portion of the anti-modification 
provisions which reads: “real property that is the debtor’s principal 
residence . . . .”84 The court reasoned that by including the verb “is” in 
the quoted text, “Congress equated the terms ‘real property’ and 
‘principal residence.’”85 Following this “equating logic,” the court 
determined  that “the real property that secures the mortgage must be 
only the debtor’s principal residence in order for the anti-modification 
provision to apply.”86 Put differently, the court continued, “[a] claim 
secured by real property that is, even in part, not the debtor’s principal 
residence” can be modified.87 
 
 80. More precisely, Scarborough was decided in 2006—following BAPCPA’s 
effective date. In re Scarborough, 461 F.3d 406, 412 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006). However, 
because the main case in Scarborough was commenced four years before the effective 
date, BAPCPA did not apply. Id. Thus, the Third Circuit expressly left 
the consideration of BAPCPA’s impact on the issue before the court for another day. Id. 
 81. Id. at 410–11. 
 82. Id. at 409. 
 83. Id. at 411. 
 84. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 85. Scarborough, 461 F.3d at 411. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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Next, the Scarborough court recognized that such reading of 
the anti-modification provisions subjects the principal-residence status 
of real property to the will of the debtor.88 To address this issue, the 
court held that the nature of the subject property is determined as of the 
moment the mortgage is created.89 If the debtor uses her home solely as 
a principal residence at the time the mortgage was entered into, the anti-
modification protection will attach, and no future change in the use of 
the property will remove it.90 Because the lender in Scarborough took a 
mortgage on real property that was, at the time of loan origination, 
partly residential, partly income-producing rental property, the court 
allowed modification of the claim secured by the mortgage as consistent 
with the mortgagee’s expectations.91 
Following enactment of the BAPCPA and the BTCA, some courts 
continue to apply the textual approach adopted in Scarborough despite 
the language of the definitions introduced with these amendments. 
These courts can be further divided into two sub-groups. Some of the 
courts continue to follow this approach without even acknowledging 
the changes introduced by these statutory enactments.92 Other courts 
take the new definitions into account but diminish their relevance.93 
In In re Picchi, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit 
adopted the same approach, and allowed the modification of a mortgage 
on a two-family dwelling.94 In doing so, the Appellate Panel primarily 
 
 88. Id. at 412 (“[A] debtor could easily sidestep the . . . home mortgage exception 
by adding a second living unit to the property on the eve of the commencement of his 
Chapter 13 proceeding.” (quoting In re Bulson, 327 B.R. 830, 846 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
2005)). 
 89. Id. (“It is at that point in time that the underwriting decision is made and it is 
therefore at that point in time that the lender must know whether the loan it is making 
may be subject to modification in a Chapter 13 proceeding at some later date.” (quoting 
Bulson, 327 B.R. at 846)). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 414. 
 92. See, e.g., In re Krus, 582 B.R. 218, 222 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2018) (adopting the 
first approach without discussing the BAPCPA, the BTCA, or the relevant definitions 
introduced by these amendments); In re Moorer, 544 B.R. 702, 706 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 
2016) (same). 
 93. See, e.g., In re Picchi, 448 B.R. 870, 875 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011); In re Jordan, 
403 B.R. 339, 346 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009); In re Davis, 386 B.R. 182, 187 (B.A.P. 6th 
Cir. 2008). 
 94. Picchi, 448 B.R. at 871. Technically, because the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 
for the First Circuit issued its decision in Picchi in reliance on the First Circuit’s 
precedent in Lomas discussed above, Picchi is an example of a case relying on 
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relied on the First Circuit’s precedential holding in Lomas, which had 
found that the anti-modification provisions were ambiguous.95 In 
addition, the court addressed whether the Lomas court’s holding has 
been abrogated by the clarifying definitions of “debtor’s personal 
residence”96 and “incidental property”97 introduced by the BAPCPA.98 
The court made two textual points regarding the impact of the BAPCPA. 
First, while interpreting the definition of “debtor’s principal 
residence,” the Picchi court stated that the reference to “a residential 
structure” in sub-paragraph (A) of the definition is qualified by the list 
of “living units” in sub-paragraph (B).99 The combination of the two 
sub-paragraphs left the court convinced that “a residential structure” can 
only refer to the debtor’s “actual living unit.”100 Accordingly, because 
a rented unit does not represent a space encompassing an actual living 
unit of the debtor, but rather that of a tenant, it cannot be included in 
a “residential structure.”101 
Second, while focusing on the definition of “incidental property,” 
the Picchi court rejected the creditor’s assertion that the phrase 
 
legislative history rather than statutory text. However, because Picchi conducted a 
detailed textual analysis of the BAPCPA and its effects on the First Circuit’s holding in 
Lomas, I discuss the case alongside other textual opinions. 
 95. Id. at 874. The court perceived the ambiguity slightly differently than the First 
Circuit did in Lomas. According to the Picchi court, the anti-modification provisions 
could be understood to bar modification of a claim secured by a security interest in real 
property that: (1) includes the debtor’s principal residence; or (2) is exclusively the 
debtor’s principal residence. Id. 
 96. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A). 
 97. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27B). 
 98. Picchi, 448 B.R. at 874. The court did not address the effect of the BTCA of 
the First Circuit’s holding in Lomas. As discussed above, the BTCA changed the 
definition of “debtor’s principal residence” to require that the residential structure in 
which the principal residence is situated must actually be “used as the principal 
residence by the debtor . . . .” Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 3557 (2010) 
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)). Nevertheless, the BTCA was enacted only after the 
briefs in Picchi were filed, the amendment does not specify its temporal scope, and 
neither party asked the court to determine whether the BTCA should apply. Picchi, 448 
B.R. at 872. Accordingly, the court decided the case based on the law effective before 
the BTCA’s enactment. Id. 
 99. Id. at 874. Sub-paragraph (B) of the definition of “debtor’s principal residence” 
includes such “living units” as “an individual condominium or cooperative unit, a 
mobile or manufactured home, or trailer . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(B). 
 100. Id. at 875. 
 101. See id. 
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“including property commonly conveyed with a principal residence in 
the area where the real property is located[]” in sub-paragraph (A) of the 
definition can include a rental unit within a multi-unit dwelling.102 
Instead, the court sided with the bankruptcy court’s construction that the 
phrase includes objects like a “boiler, the attached garage, [or] the 
window treatments that are typically listed in a standard mortgage.”103 
Based on the above, the court in Picchi held that “[t]he meaning 
and scope of [the anti-modification provisions] have not been altered by 
the definitions of ‘debtor’s principal residence’ and ‘incidental property’ 
introduced by BAPCPA.”104 
The Fourth Circuit also addressed the impacts of the definitions 
introduced by BAPCPA in In re Ennis—a case involving a security 
interest in a mobile home.105 The mobile home was the debtors’ 
principal residence, which sat on a lot leased by the debtors in a mobile 
home park.106 
The court in Ennis stated that for the anti-modification provisions 
to apply, two requirements must be met: “first, the security interest must 
be in real property, and second, the real property must be the debtor’s 
principal residence.”107 Further, the court continued, the definition of 
“debtor’s principal residence” pertains only to the second requirement 
and leaves in place the “real property” requirement.108 
The court recognized that a debtor can situate her principal 
residence in personal property, such as a mobile home.109 However, for 
the anti-modification protection to apply, the debtor’s principal 
residence must constitute real property—a requirement not abolished by 
the BAPCPA.110 Thus, to prevent modification of a claim secured by a 
security interest in a mobile home, the mobile home must represent real 
property under the applicable non-bankruptcy law.111 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. In re Ennis, 558 F.3d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 345–46. 
 108. Id. at 346. 
 109. Id. (citing Herrin v. GreenTree—Al, LLC, 376 B.R. 316, 320 (S.D. Ala. 
2007)). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. In the context of security interests in mobile homes, this is a widely 
accepted holding. See, e.g., In re Jordan, 403 B.R. 339, 346 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009); In 
re Davis, 386 B.R. 182, 187 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008). 
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The Ennis court found that the first requirement was undisputedly 
satisfied in this case—the mobile home was the debtor’s principal 
residence.112 Thus, the remaining issue for the court to determine was 
whether the debtor’s mobile home represented real property under 
Virginia law, the applicable state law.113 It found that Virginia law 
classified mobile homes as personal property.114 Because the real 
property requirement was not met, the court allowed the modification 
sought by the debtors.115 
The court in In re Bradsher applied the Fourth Circuit’s logic in a 
case where the creditor held a security interest both in real property that 
was the debtors’ principal residence and in escrow funds.116 The 
Bradsher court recognized that post-BAPCPA, the definition of debtor’s 
principal residence explicitly includes, through the sub-definition of 
incidental property, escrow funds.117 Following the Fourth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Ennis, however, the court stated that inclusion need not 
indicate that the anti-modification protection governs.118 The protection 
applies only if escrow funds constitute real property under state law—in 
this case, North Carolina law.119 Because the court found that under 
North Carolina law, escrow funds constitute personal property, 
the creditor’s claim was not secured only by a security interest in real 
property.120 Accordingly, the court held that the claim is not entitled to 
the anti-modification protection.121 
Although Ennis, Bradsher, and the courts that follow them do not 
specifically address multi-unit properties, the courts’ rationales for these 
holdings nonetheless suggest that a security interest simultaneously 
covering multi-unit property and rental income sits outside the reach of 
the anti-modification provisions. Unless rental income constitutes real 
property under the applicable state law or any claim to such rent is 
waived by the mortgagee, the anti-modification protection should not be 
viewed as governing—despite the language of the BAPCPA including 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 347. 
 115. Id. 
 116. In re Bradsher, 427 B.R. 386, 388 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2010). 
 117. Id. at 389. 
 118. Id. at 389–90. 
 119. Id. at 390. 
 120. Id. at 391. 
 121. Id. at 391–92. 
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rents in the definition of the debtor’s principal residence through its sub-
definition of incidental property.122 
While the Residential-Use-Only Approach represents a bright-line 
rule, it has been criticized for potentially being subject to abuse by 
debtors. In In re Zaldivar, the court was concerned that this approach 
“would permit security interests to be modified on a debtor’s primary 
residence when the debtor decides to rent out a garage apartment or 
convert a basement into a rentable apartment.”123 Presumably, however, 
these concerns arise only when the court determines the principal-
residence status of the subject property as of the petition date, as 
opposed to the loan origination date. 
B. THE CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH: THE ANTI-MODIFICATION 
PROVISIONS APPLY TO REAL PROPERTY THAT HAS BEEN INTENDED BY 
THE PARTIES TO BE USED PRIMARILY AS THE DEBTOR’S RESIDENTIAL 
PROPERTY 
Alternatively, some courts consider the totality of circumstances to 
determine the intention of the parties to a particular transaction. 
Specifically, these courts focus on whether the parties to a particular 
mortgage transaction predominantly intended to provide the debtor with: 
(i) a home; or (ii) the source of an investment income or the premises for 
the operation of a business.124 
 
 122. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A), (27B)(B); see also In re Ferandos, 402 F.3d 147 
(3d Cir. 2005) (holding, pre-BAPCPA, that under New Jersey law, real property is 
defined to include rents, and,  therefore, the grant of a security interest in rents in 
addition to the debtors’ home did not render the claim secured by anything other than 
real property). 
 123. In re Zaldivar, 441 B.R. 389, 390 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011); see also In re 
Guilbert, 176 B.R. 302, 305 (D.R.I. 1995) (stating that, under this approach, 
“homeowners poised to file for protection under Chapter 13 would, as a matter of 
course, seek temporary tenants prior to their filing, in order to modify the rights that 
their secured creditors have in their home.”). 
 124. E.g., In re Brunson, 201 B.R. 351, 353 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996); Litton Loan 
Servicing, LP v. Beamon, 298 B.R. 508, 512 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (adopting this approach, 
and criticizing the Residential-Use-Only Approach adopted by the First and Third 
Circuits because it “arbitrarily exclude[s] multi-family residences that are both used as 
a principal residence and covered by a residential mortgage from the reach of [the anti-
modification provisions] . . . [and] allow[s] modification of mortgages that are 
indisputably residential in nature.”); In re Zaldivar, 441 B.R. 389, 391 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2011) (holding that “the predominant character of the transaction governs whether 
the anti-modification provision applies.”). 
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To determine the parties’ predominant intention, courts consider a 
number of factors, including whether the debtor owns other properties 
where she could reside, whether the debtor has a principal occupation 
other than as a landlord, the ratio of the income generated from the real 
estate to the debtor’s total income, whether the mortgage was processed 
through the commercial or residential mortgage department of the 
creditor, the interest rate, the demographics of the relevant market, and 
the extent to which potential non-residential uses of the real property 
were considered by the creditor.125 
After considering the above factors, courts determine whether the 
real property in question is primarily “commercial property,” and 
therefore permits modification, or primarily “residential property,” 
which is covered by the anti-modification protection.126 
In In re Baker, the debtors sought modification of a loan secured by 
a mortgage on their principal residence, arguing that at its inception, 
the mortgage covered both the debtors’ current residence as well as their 
old property.127 Nevertheless, the court denied the request, finding a 
predominantly residential character to the transaction.128 The court found 
that parties understood that the purpose of the transaction was to provide 
a bridge loan to the debtors which would enable them to acquire a new 
home, while simultaneously proceeding with the sale of the old one.129 
The court in In re Zaldivar reached the opposite conclusion.130 In 
Zaldivar, the mortgage agreement covered a duplex partly used by the 
debtor as her principal residence, partly rented to a third party.131 The 
court focused on the fact that a family rider attached to the mortgage 
agreement deleted an otherwise standard provision establishing an 
owner-occupancy requirement.132 The court stated that because the 
debtor was not required to occupy the subject property at all, the 
 
 125. In re Brunson, 201 B.R. 351, 353 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 126. See id. at 354. In Brunson, the debtor sought modification of a mortgage on her 
two-family dwelling. Id. at 351. The opinion does not, however, apply the multi-factor 
test to the facts of the case. Instead, the Brunson court concluded by setting 
an evidentiary hearing consistent with the decision. Id. at 354. 
 127. In re Baker, 398 B.R. 198, 201 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 128. See id. at 204. 
 129. Id. 
 130. In re Zaldivar, 441 B.R. 389, 391 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 131. Id. at 389. 
 132. Id. at 391. 
2021] MULTI-USE MORTGAGE MODIFICATIONS 465 
character of the transaction could not be viewed as predominantly 
residential.133 
While some courts stated that this approach is the most faithful to 
congressional intent,134 the Third Circuit in Scarborough was not 
convinced. The Third Circuit criticized this approach for “introduc[ing] 
uncertainty and unpredictability to residential mortgage transactions” 
and for “requir[ing] courts to engage in a subjective, hindsight analysis 
of the parties’ intentions.”135 
C. THE MIXED-USE APPROACH: THE ANTI-MODIFICATION PROVISIONS 
APPLY TO REAL PROPERTY THAT IS USED BY THE DEBTOR AS PRINCIPAL 
RESIDENCE, EVEN IF THE PROPERTY IS ALSO USED FOR 
ADDITIONAL PURPOSES 
Finally, some courts extend the anti-modification protection to 
claims secured by a mortgage on real property so long as the debtor uses 
the property as her principal residence, regardless of additional, non-
residential uses of the property. While it seems that this approach 
remains the minority rule, it might also represent an emerging trend.136 
Before enactment of the BAPCPA and the BTCA, courts adopting 
this approach deployed mostly textual arguments, focusing on 
the placement of the term “only” within the anti-modification 
provision.137 To reiterate its wording, the provision prohibits 
the modification of “a claim secured only by a security interest in real 
property that is the debtor’s principal residence . . . .”138 
In Macaluso, the debtor sought modification of a mortgage on a 
single parcel of property that included a tailor shop and two residential 
apartments, one of which was occupied by the debtor.139 The court 
reviewed the first two interpretive approaches, and rejected both of 
 
 133. Id. (citing In re Brunson, 201 B.R. 351, 354 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
 134. E.g., id. at 390–91 (“[T]he entire point of the anti-modification provision[s] . . . 
is to ‘encourage the flow of capital into the home lending market’ by reducing risk to 
mortgagees . . . .” (citing Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) 
(Stevens, J., concurring))); In re Brunson, 201 B.R. at 354 (stating that this approach 
“serves congressional intent of encouraging home mortgage lending . . . .”). 
 135. In re Scarborough, 461 F.3d 406, 414 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 136. In re Brooks, 550 B.R. 19, 25 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2016) (referring to the third 
approach as an emerging minority view). 
 137. See, e.g., In re Macaluso, 254 B.R. 799, 799 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 138. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) (emphasis added). 
 139. Macaluso, 254 B.R. at 799. 
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them.140 Instead, the court found that the language of the anti-
modification provisions clearly and unambiguously requires the 
adoption of the Mixed-Use Approach.141 In the court’s view, the term 
“only” in the language of the provisions must be read as an adverb 
solely modifying the adjective “secured.”142 In other words, 
the Macaluso court reasoned, the word “only” does not limit application 
of the anti-modification provisions “to property that is used only as 
a principal residence, but [requires that] the only collateral is a single 
parcel of real estate . . . .”143 Accordingly, the court denied the proposed 
modification.144 
Post-BAPCPA and BTCA, a number of courts have adopted this 
approach, focusing primarily on textual analysis. In In re Schayes, the 
debtors purchased a house and lived in it with the intent to rent it out to 
generate income.145 The debtors’ property was a single-family 
residence.146 Nevertheless, they proposed a modification of their 
mortgage relying on Scarborough’s holding rendered in a multi-unit 
context, requiring that the subject property is used solely for residential 
purposes.147 The debtors alleged that because they held the property with 
the intent to generate income, the property was used for both 
commercial and residential purposes.148 
The Schayes court stated that Scarborough and its progeny were 
significantly factually distinguishable simply because they dealt with 
multi-unit dwellings.149 The court went further, however, and stated that 
“even if Scarborough were not factually distinguishable . . . it is not 
supported by the plain language of the statute.”150 The court held that, 
rather than to follow the pre-BAPCPA statutory interpretation, “the 
better statutory analysis seems to be that other, additional actual uses 
have no relevance under the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code, so 
 
 140. Id. at 800. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. In re Schayes, 483 B.R. 209, 210–11 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2012). 
 146. Id. at 211. 
 147. Id. at 215. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 216. 
 150. Id. 
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long as there is an actual use as the debtor’s principal residence.”151 
Because the court found that the debtors were actually using the house 
as their principal residence, their request for modification was denied.152 
In In re Wages, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth 
Circuit analyzed proposed modification of a mortgage on property that 
the debtors used as their principal residence, to park tractors and trailers 
used in the debtors’ trucking business, and as an office from which they 
operated the trucking business.153 The Appellate Panel first held that the 
petition date, not the loan origination date, should determine the use and 
nature of the subject property.154 Next, the court stated that for the anti-
modification provisions to apply, three requirements must be met: “first, 
the security interest must be in real property; second, the real property 
must be the only security for the debt; and third, the real property must 
be the debtor’s principal residence.”155 Because there was no dispute that 
the first two requirements were met, the court focused on the third.156 
On the question of whether the collateral was the debtor’s principal 
residence, the Wages court first reviewed the Residential-Use-Only 
Approach.157 It disagreed with the Scarborough court’s “parsing of the 
words” of the anti-modification provisions because this approach 
disregards the definition of “debtor’s principal residence.”158 The Wages 
court stated that “the definition avoids defining ‘real property’ and also 
clarifies that whether a structure is a principal residence is independent 
of whether it might be real property.”159 Thus, it reasoned, 
Scarborough’s equating of “real property” with “debtor’s principal 
residence” is misplaced.160 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 217. 
 153. In re Wages, 508 B.R. 161, 163 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014). 
 154. Id. at 164. The court did not elaborate on this portion of its holding, and 
referred to its settled case law on the issue instead. Id. (citing In re Abdelgadir, 455 
B.R. 896, 902–03 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011); In re Benafel, 461 B.R. 581, 591 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 2011); In re Wind N’ Wave, 328 B.R. 176, 181 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005)). 
 155. In re Wages, 508 B.R. at 165. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 166. To give credit to the Third Circuit’s “parsing of the words” in 
Scarborough, note that the definition of “debtor’s principal residence” was not 
applicable in that case due to the BAPCPA’s temporal scope. In re Scarborough, 461 
F.3d 406, 412 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 159. Wages, 508 B.R. at 166. 
 160. Id. 
468 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
The court then turned to the Case-by-Case Approach. It rejected the 
approach for being inconsistent with the court’s case law regarding the 
relevant moment at which the court determines the nature and use of the 
subject property.161 As noted above, the court makes this determination 
as of the petition date.162 The Case-by-Case Approach, on the other 
hand, looks to the parties’ intention as of the loan origination date.163 
Thus, the court turned to the Mixed-Use Approach. The court 
rejected the notion that the anti-modification protection does not attach 
unless: (i) the subject property is being used exclusively as the debtor’s 
principal residence; or (ii) the commercial use of the property becomes 
sufficiently significant.164 As the court simply put it, “either a property is 
a debtor’s principal residence or it is not.”165 Further, the court rejected 
the debtors’ argument that the word “only” in the language of the 
provisions requires that the subject property serves only one function, 
that of being a principal residence.166 Instead, the court agreed with 
the Schayes court, which reasoned that the word “only” simply requires 
that the sole collateral securing the subject mortgage is real property.167 
Based on the above, the Wages court held that “the anti-
modification [provision] applies to any loan secured only by real 
property that the debtor uses as a principal residence property, even if 
that real property also serves additional purposes.”168 It thus denied the 
debtors’ proposal to modify their mortgage.169 
In In re Addams, the debtor sought modification of a mortgage on 
her multi-unit property.170 The debtor principally resided in one of the 
units, while renting out the second unit to a third party.171 In addition, 
the repayment of the relevant note was secured not only by a mortgage 
on the real property itself, but also by an assignment of rents generated 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. (citations omitted). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 167. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. In re Schayes, 483 B.R. 209, 215 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2012). And, as noted above, 
in Wages there was no dispute that this requirement had been satisfied. Wages, 508 
B.R. at 165. 
 168. Wages, 508 B.R. at 168. 
 169. Id. 
 170. In re Addams, 564 B.R. 458, 459 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 171. Id. 
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by renting the second unit.172 The Addams court stressed that Congress 
defined “debtor’s principal residence” to include, through the 
accompanying definition of “incidental property,” rents derived from 
real property.173 It follows that “a security interest in rents is part of 
the security interest in the principal residence.”174 Therefore, the court 
stated, simply because the debtor “had a right to rent out a portion of the 
[property] and the [creditors] had a security in such rentals does not 
change the conclusion that the [creditors’] claim is a claim secured only 
by a security interest in real property that is [the debtor’s] principal 
residence . . . .”175 Additionally, the Addams court determined that the 
principal-residence status should be determined as of the loan 
origination date.176 Because there was no dispute that the subject 
property was used by the debtor as her principal residence at the time of 
the loan origination, the court prohibited the debtor from modifying 
the secured claim.177 
A number of other courts have also adopted the Mixed-Use 
Approach in the post-BAPCPA and BTCA period.178 
 
 172. Id. at 460. 
 173. Id. at 466. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. Note that the court might have found additional support for this conclusion 
in its finding that under New York law—the applicable state law—a security interest in 
rents represents an interest in real property, not personalty. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. E.g., In re Harriman, No. 12-49371, 2014 WL 1312103, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) (adopting the third approach and stating that “the [Wages court’s] 
interpretation of the anti-modification provision is the most consistent and sensible 
reading of the statute.” (citing In re Wages, 508 B.R. 161, 168 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014))); 
In re Cady, No. 3:14-BK-3817-PMG, 2015 WL 631359, at *5 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 
27, 2015) (finding the subject property to constitute the debtor’s principal residence, 
even though the debtor simultaneously used the property as a home office for his work 
as a real estate agent); Utzman v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., No. 15-CV-04299-RS, 2016 
WL 795739, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016) (holding that so long as the claim is secured 
only by real property that the debtor uses as principal residence, renting out a portion of 
the property to a third-party tenant does not remove the anti-modification protection); 
In re Kelly, No. CV 15-06419-DD, 2016 WL 2893984, at *6 (Bankr. D.S.C. May 11, 
2016) (“[I]f [real] property is the only collateral for a secured creditor’s claim and is 
used as the debtor’s principal residence, the mere fact that the property or a portion of 
the property is used for some other purpose does not preclude the application of the 
anti-modification provisions . . . .”); In re Brooks, 550 B.R. 19, 25 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 
2016) (adopting the third approach and stating that while it might not be the majority 
rule, “it is an emerging view.”); In re Hock, 571 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2017); In re 
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III. PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF THE EMERGING SPLIT 
Courts should adopt the Mixed-Use Approach. That is, courts 
should interpret the anti-modification provisions as currently enacted to 
prohibit modification of a mortgage on real property that is actually 
being used as the principal residence of the debtor, even if the debtor 
simultaneously uses the property for additional, including income-
generating, purposes. 
Support for the adoption of the Mixed-Use Approach lies primarily 
in the language of the relevant statutory definitions. As it is shown in 
the text that follows, the definition of “debtor’s principal residence” 
comprises of terms representing both real as well as personal property. 
Accordingly, case law equating the terms “real property” and “debtor’s 
principal residence” in the language of the anti-modification provisions 
in support of the Residential-Use-Only Approach should be rejected. 
Further, the express language of the definitions anticipates that part 
of the principal residence of the debtor can be used for generating 
income. Thus, case law adopting the Residential-Use-Only Approach 
after concluding that the anti-modification provisions do not apply to 
any real property that is not used exclusively for residential purposes 
should be rejected as well. 
The most recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code relevant for 
the issue, the BAPCPA and the BTCA in particular, rendered the anti-
modification provisions unambiguous. Therefore, decisions adopting 
either the Residential-Use-Only Approach or Case-by-Case Approach 
with reference to legislative history after finding the provisions 
ambiguous should no longer apply. 
Even if a court would find the provisions ambiguous, however, 
the purpose of the provisions was to introduce certainty to the market 
with residential mortgages. Because I believe that such purpose is best 
served by the Mixed-Use Approach, the other approaches should be 
rejected. 
 
Wissel, 619 B.R. 299, 320 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2020) (prohibiting the debtors from 
modifying a mortgage on their real property in which they principally resided while 
simultaneously using the property to run two home businesses). 
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A. ADOPTION OF THE MIXED-USE APPROACH IS SUPPORTED BY 
THE UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE ANTI-MODIFICATION PROVISIONS 
Section 1322(b)(2) prohibits the debtor from modifying “the rights 
of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a 
security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal 
residence . . . .”179 The Bankruptcy Code defines what constitutes 
debtor’s principal residence through two separate definitions. 
First, Section 101(13A) defines “debtor’s principal residence” as: 
(A) mean[ing] a residential structure if used as the principal 
residence by the debtor, including incidental property, without 
regard to whether that structure is attached to real property; and 
(B) includ[ing] an individual condominium or cooperative unit, a 
mobile or manufactured home, or trailer if used as the principal 
residence by the debtor.180 
Second, Section 101(27B) further elaborates on that definition by 
separately defining “incidental property” to include, among others, “all 
easements, rights, appurtenances, fixtures, rents, royalties, mineral 
rights, oil or gas rights or profits, water rights, escrow funds, or 
insurance proceeds . . . .”181 
In Scarborough, the Third Circuit equated the terms “real property” 
and “debtor’s principal residence” in the language of the anti-
modification provisions.182 That equivalency exists only when the 
subject property is used in its entirety solely as the debtor’s principal 
residence.183 If, for example, part of the property is rented out, the 
equivalency is not satisfied because the property is being partly used to 
generate rental income.184 With such property, the anti-modification 
 
 179. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 180. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A) (emphasis added). 
 181. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27B)(B). 
 182. In re Scarborough, 461 F.3d 406, 411 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 183. Id. (stating that the anti-modification provisions protect “claims secured only 
by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence, not real 
property that includes or contains the debtor’s principal residence, and not real property 
on which the debtor resides.” (quoting In re Adebanjo, 165 B.R. 98, 104 (Bankr. D. 
Conn. 1994)). 
 184. Id. 
472 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
provisions do not apply, and a plan provision dependent on bifurcation 
of the mortgage is subject to confirmation.185 
Scarborough’s analysis no longer applies under the current state of 
the Bankruptcy Code. Scarborough was decided pre-BAPCPA, before 
the Bankruptcy Code expressly defined “debtor’s principal 
residence.”186 The BAPCPA enacted a definition of this phrase 
clarifying that a “residential structure” includes “incidental property.”187 
Intuitively, the “residential structure” portion of the definition captures 
the “main” real property where a debtor’s principal residence is 
primarily situated.188 The “incidental property” portion, on the other 
hand, typically consists of non-residential assets that represent both real 
and personal property “without regard to whether [such assets are] 
attached to real property.”189 
The above becomes apparent upon a closer look at the definition of 
“incidental property.” Some of the terms listed in sub-paragraph (B) of 
the definition, such as easements, fixtures, or rents may be considered, 
depending on the applicable non-bankruptcy law, real property.190 
Others, such as escrow funds or insurance proceeds will most commonly 
represent personal property.191 
It follows that Scarborough’s logic of equating “real property” and 
“debtor’s principal residence” no longer applies because the BAPCPA 
defined the latter term to include both real and personal property.192 To 
this extent, Scarborough has been effectively overridden by Congress. 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 412 n.2. More precisely, Scarborough did not apply the BAPCPA due to 
its temporal scope. Id. 
 187. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A). 
 188. See id. 
 189. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 101(27B); see also In re Hock, 571 B.R. 891, 895 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 2017) (“[T]he definition contemplates that a debtor’s principal residence may be a 
residential structure that the debtor uses as his principal residence plus incidental, non-
residential property.”). 
 190. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27B)(B); see also In re Addams, 564 B.R. 458, 466 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding that “rents” represent real property under New York 
law). 
 191. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27B)(B); see also In re Bradsher, 427 B.R. 386, 391 
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2010) (finding that “escrow funds” represent personal property under 
North Carolina law); In re Lunger, 370 B.R. 649, 651 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2007) (reaching 
the same conclusion under Pennsylvania law). 
 192. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27B)(B); see also In re Wages, 508 B.R. 161, 166 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he definition does not equate the term ‘real property’ with ‘debtor’s 
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Because the equating argument falls, nothing explicitly dictates that 
the subject property must be used exclusively as principal residence for 
the anti-modification provisions to apply. Accordingly, the provisions 
apply even if the debtor simultaneously uses the property for residential 
as well as other purposes—such as for generating rental income. In fact, 
the BTCA clarified in 2010 that the only requirement for the anti-
modification protection to apply is that the subject-property is actually 
being “used as the principal residence by the debtor.”193 
The same conclusion can be reached not only by rejecting the Third 
Circuit’s reasoning in Scarborough; it can also be positively deduced 
from the income-generating nature of the definition of incidental 
property. Some items listed in sub-paragraph (B) of the definition, such 
as mineral rights, oil or gas rights, or water rights typically represent 
legal entitlements that are inherent in the nature of the real property in 
question, and belong to the property owner regardless of whether she 
decides to monetize them or not.194 Others, such as rents, escrow funds, 
or insurance proceeds are entitlements that only exist because they were 
bargained for by the property owner and the respective counterparty.195 
This distinction is significant for the following reasons. The 
inclusion of the first group of items recognizes that while some debtors 
live in a dwelling located on a potentially income-generating land,196 
that by itself should not prevent the characterization of the property as 
the debtor’s principal residence. The second group reveals that debtors 
should be free to actively proceed with, for example, renting out part of 
their residence encumbered by a mortgage without removing the anti-
 
principal residence.’ Therefore, an analysis which equates the two is misplaced.”); 
Utzman v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., No. 15-CV-04299-RS, 2016 WL 795739, at *6 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 1, 2016) (“The[] changes [introduced by the BAPCPA] make clear Congress 
did not equate the terms ‘real property’ and ‘debtor’s principal residence.’”); In re 
Wissel, 619 B.R. 299, 313 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2020) (referring to the statutory definitions 
introduced by the BAPCPA, and stating that “[t]hese additions represent a clear 
Congressional statement that ‘real property’ and ‘debtor’s principal residence’ are no 
longer coterminous.”). 
 193. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A); Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 3557 
(2010). 
 194. See id. Most commonly, these entitlements will represent in rem, or property 
rights. 
 195. See id. Most commonly, these entitlements will represent in personam, or 
contractual rights. 
 196. In this context, the income-generating potential of the land can stem, for 
example, from oils or minerals located on the property. 
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modification protection afforded to the respective creditors. Importantly, 
both groups have income-generating potential. 
The income-generating nature of sub-paragraph (B) of 
the definition is further highlighted by the inclusion of “oil or gas rights 
or profits” among the constituents of incidental property.197 The quoted 
text strongly indicates that a debtor need not merely hold rights to 
minerals, oil, gas, or other valuable commodities possibly located on the 
property passively. The debtor could actively engage in utilizing the 
rights and thereby generate profits. The debtor can do all of that without 
disturbing the principal-residence status of the subject property. 
The above analysis can be tested on the following logic. For “rents” 
to exist, the property owner must rent at least part of the property that 
she uses as principal residence to a third party. From that moment on, 
the owner presumably generates rental income, and no longer uses the 
subject property exclusively as her principal residence. Nevertheless, the 
“rents” generated in this context are covered by the scope of “incidental 
property” which, in turn, is included in the definition of “debtor’s 
principal residence.”198 
Accordingly, any analysis which concludes that the property loses 
its status as the debtor’s principal residence, simply by renting a portion 
of real property where the debtor resides, would effectively read “rents” 
out of the statute. There would be no use for it. 
A number of recent decisions addressing multi-unit properties 
followed a substantially similar analysis.199 Where the debtor did not 
 
 197. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27B)(B). 
 198. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(27B)(B), (13A)(A). 
 199. See e.g., In re Addams, 564 B.R. 458, 466 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Congress 
defined the debtor’s principal residence to include rents derived from the real property, 
and, as such, a security interest in rents is part of the security interest in the principal 
residence.”); In re Hock, 571 B.R. 891, 895 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2017) (stating that the 
statutory definitions contemplate that a debtor’s principal residence may include a 
residential structure as well as incidental, non-residential property); Utzman v. Suntrust 
Mortg., Inc., No. 15-CV-04299, 2016 WL 795739, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016) 
(“[T]he fact that [the debtors] rent out a small portion of the property does not defeat 
the applicability of the [anti-modification protection].”); In re Kelly, No. CV 15-06419, 
2016 WL 2893984, at *4 (Bankr. D.S.C. May 11, 2016) (relying on the inclusion of 
“rents” in the definition of incidental property, and denying modification sought by the 
debtor even though the mortgage agreement contained an assignment of rents clause). 
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rent part of her principal residence to a third party but instead used it to 
run a home-business, recent courts have followed the same approach.200 
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit in In re Picchi 
reached the opposite conclusion when it held that the anti-modification 
provisions do not bar bifurcation of a claim secured by a multi-unit 
dwelling.201 As other courts did before, the court focused on whether the 
definition of “incidental property” could include a rental unit within a 
multi-unit dwelling.202 
The Picchi court rejected the debtor’s argument that the  phrase 
“property commonly conveyed with a principal residence in the area 
where the real property is located” in sub-paragraph (A) of the definition 
of incidental property can include a rental unit.203 Instead, the court 
interpreted the phrase to cover only objects such as a boiler, attached 
garage, or window treatments.204 While that reading is plausible, the 
court nowhere explained why a rental unit cannot be subsumed in sub-
paragraph (B) of the same definition which expressly lists “rents.”205 
Presumably, the Picchi court was focused on the fact that 
the definition nowhere expressly covers a rental unit within the debtor’s 
principal residence, and omitted that the rents derived from the same 
unit are expressly included.206 Nevertheless, these are two sides of the 
 
 200. See, e.g., In re Wages, 508 B.R. 161, 168 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014) (denying 
modification of a mortgage on the debtors’ principal residence which the debtors used 
to operate their trucking business); In re Cady, No. 3:14-BK-3817, 2015 WL 631359, at 
*1 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2015) (denying modification even though the debtor 
simultaneously used the subject property as his principal residence and as a home office 
for his work as a real estate agent); In re Wissel, 619 B.R. 299, 320 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
2020) (denying modification where the debtors allegedly used their principal residence 
to run an interior and exterior design business which generated nearly all of the debtors’ 
household income). 
 201. In re Picchi, 448 B.R. 870, 875 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27B)(B). 
 206. To better understand the court’s position, it is worth mentioning that the court 
was bound by the First Circuit’s precedential holding in Lomas. Picchi, 448 B.R. at 872 
(citing Lomas Mortg., Inc. v. Louis, 82 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996)). As discussed above, 
before the enactment of the BAPCPA, the Lomas court found the anti-modification 
provisions ambiguous, and adopted the first interpretive approach by consulting the 
legislative history. See Lomas, 82 F.3d at 7. The Picchi court, in turn, focused on 
whether the ambiguity perceived by the First Circuit was removed by the statutory 
definitions introduced by the BAPCPA. The court held it was not. Picchi, 448 B.R. at 
874. 
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same coin. There are no rents without a rental unit. Therefore, the 
Appellate Panel either purposefully ignored the inclusion of “rents” in 
sub-paragraph (B) of the definition, or effectively read the term out of 
the statute. 
Some courts hold that if, in addition to a mortgage on real property 
itself, a creditor holds a security interest in an item included in the 
definition of incidental property, the inclusion alone does not mean that 
the anti-modification protection applies. According to these courts, 
whether or not the protection applies depends on the characterization of 
the particular item under the applicable state law. Only if the item 
represents real property, the protection applies.207 
This question commonly arises where a creditor takes a security 
interest in escrow funds, in addition to a mortgage on the debtor’s 
residence. For example, the court in In re Bradsher found that because 
the creditor held a security interest both in real property and escrow 
funds, which were classified as personalty under state law, the anti-
modification protection did not attach.208 The court relied on the 
language of the anti-modification provisions, which requires that a 
security interest be held “only in real property” for the provisions to 
apply.209 
That reading, however, ignores the language that follows and 
qualifies the type of real property that must be held. Only such real 
property that represents the debtor’s principal residence triggers the anti-
modification protection.210 Even if the applicable state law classifies 
rents, escrow funds, insurance proceeds, etc. as real property, these 
realties will inevitably be separate and distinct from the “main” real 
property in which the debtor’s principal residence is actually situated. 
Logically, a debtor cannot situate her principal residence in, for 
example, insurance proceeds or escrow funds. 
Applying the reasoning of the Bradsher court to the above logic, 
a mortgage agreement that covers these additional items falls outside the 
anti-modification protection because such mortgage not only encumbers 
 
 207. See e.g., In re Bradsher, 427 B.R. 386, 389 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2010); In re 
Martin, 444 B.R. 538, 543 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2011). 
 208. See Bradsher, 427 B.R. at 391–92 (finding escrow funds to constitute personal 
property under North Carolina law). 
 209. See id. at 387. 
 210. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1322(b)(2). 
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“real property that is the debtor’s principal residence,”211 but also covers 
additional real property as well. Nevertheless, the court reached the 
exact opposite result.212 
Worse, the above reading encourages inconsistent application of 
the anti-modification provisions. Different state laws will interpret 
“easements, rights, appurtenances, fixtures, rents, royalties, mineral 
rights, oil or gas rights or profits, water rights, escrow funds, or 
insurance proceeds”213 differently. 
This apparent inconsistency is best resolved by reading the anti-
modification provisions as applying to any claim that is secured by a 
mortgage on real property that is actually being used by the debtor as 
her principal residence. That does not mean, however, that the real 
property must be the only collateral. The definition of the debtor’s 
principal residence expressly provides that it can be comprised of both: 
(i) a residential structure; and (ii) incidental property.214 While the 
residential structure will presumably equate, both in legal classification 
as well as tangible nature, to the real property in question, incidental 
property can, and most commonly will, consist of property distinct from 
the main real property.215 
State-law classification of the incidental property encumbered by 
the mortgage in question should be irrelevant. So long as the creditor 
takes a mortgage only on such real property that has the quality of being 
the debtor’s principal residence, the anti-modification protection applies. 
That some of the encumbered items covered by the definition of 
debtor’s principal residence are distinct from the main real property—
 
 211. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1322(b)(2). 
 212. See Bradsher, 427 B.R. at 392. 
 213. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27B)(B). 
 214. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A). 
 215. To illustrate how the terms “real property” and “debtor’s principal residence” 
fit and coexist together through the relevant statutory definitions, consider the following 
example: Think of a bottle of wine. The bottle represents real property, the wine is the 
principal residence. While the wine primarily resides in the bottle, the residential 
structure, it is not confined to the bottle. The wine can be poured into a glass or used to 
cook a delicious risotto. When wine leaves the bottle, however, it does not lose its 
status of principal residence. It simply relocates from its residential structure to find its 
new place in incidental property. In effect, the anti-modification provisions allow the 
owner of the bottle to pour herself a glass, while keeping the lender who financed the 
acquisition of, and took a security interest in, the bottle, protected from modification. 
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whether due to their legal status or (in)tangible nature—is of no 
import.216 
A number of post-BAPCPA decisions reached the same conclusion. 
In In re Lunger, the court held that a home-mortgage lender’s security 
interest in escrow funds did not remove the anti-modification protection 
even though escrow funds represented personal property under state 
law.217 The court stated that “since Congress chose to define all 
‘incidental property’ as included in the ‘debtor’s personal residence’ and 
all residences as being included in the term ‘real property,’ Congress has 
effectively broadened the definition of real property for the purposes of 
[the anti-modification provisions].”218 
Other courts addressing escrow funds and other proceeds as 
additional collateral followed substantially the same reasoning.219 
For example, in In re LeBlanc, the court denied modification of a 
mortgage secured, among others, by “[a]ll tenements, hereditaments, 
easements, appurtenances, rights, and privileges . . . including all rents, 
issues, and profits thereof”220 and “[a]ll furniture, fixtures, and 
 
 216. Intuitively, just about any item of the type included in the definition of 
incidental property cannot be provided as additional collateral. Only such escrow funds, 
rents, etc. that exist or are encumbered “with respect to a debtor’s principal residence” 
will qualify for incidental property that will not prevent the application of the anti-
modification provisions. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27B). 
 217. See In re Lunger, 370 B.R. 649, 651 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2007). 
 218. Id. While I agree with the Lunger court’s conclusion, I do not share its 
reasoning. As noted above, I consider the classification of the items included in the 
definition of incidental property irrelevant. I would not seek such classification under 
state law or, following Lunger’s reasoning, under the “[c]ongressionally broadened” 
definition of real property. Instead, it only matters whether a creditor took a mortgage 
only on such real property that is the debtor’s principal residence. Whatever additional 
property is encumbered with it is of no importance, so long as it falls under the 
umbrella of incidental property. 
 219. See, e.g., In re Inglis, 481 B.R. 480, 484 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2012) (addressing 
escrow funds); In re Abdosh, 513 B.R. 882, 886 (Bankr. D. Md. 2014) (referring to 
miscellaneous proceeds covered by the deed of trust and stating that even if the court 
were to consider them escrow funds, “the statute is clear that insurance proceeds and 
escrows are part and parcel of the [d]ebtors’ principal residence.”); In re Birmingham, 
846 F.3d 88, 98 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding escrow funds, insurance proceeds, and 
miscellaneous proceeds covered by the deed of trust represent incidental property that 
does not bar the anti-modification protection, and stating that state law is suspended by 
federal bankruptcy law in the determination of the issue). 
 220. In re LeBlanc, No. 08-17239-BKC-AJC, 2009 WL 3378436, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. July 22, 2009). 
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equipment . . .”221 The mortgage agreement defined these groups of 
additional collateral as “appurtenances” and “fixtures” respectively.222 
The court had no difficulty concluding that since the definition of 
incidental property includes both appurtenances and fixtures covered by 
the mortgage agreement, the anti-modification protection applied.223 
Other courts that addressed similar types of collateral reached the same 
conclusion.224 
For the above reasons, the language of the anti-modification 
provisions, when read together with the relevant statutory definitions, is 
unambiguous. The language plainly supports the adoption of the Mixed-
Use Approach. 
B. ADOPTION OF THE MIXED-USE APPROACH IS SUPPORTED BY 
THE PURPOSE OF THE ANTI-MODIFICATION PROVISIONS 
Additionally, the Mixed-Use Approach and its effects are the most 
faithful to the very purpose of the anti-modification provisions. 
As Justice Stevens stated, “the legislative history indicat[ed] that 
favorable treatment of residential mortgagees was intended to encourage 
the flow of capital into the home lending market.”225 
The Mixed-Use Approach encourages the flow of capital into 
the residential mortgage market by decreasing the credit risk faced by 
lenders and borrowing costs borne by borrowers. By decreasing the 
number of instances in which a debtor will be able to modify a claim 
secured by a mortgage on her principal residence, the risk of bifurcation 
of claims of under-secured creditors and the accompanying credit risk 
decline as well. This, in turn, allows lenders to conduct less due 
diligence or monitoring of the debtors’ use of their principal residences, 
 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at *3. 
 224. See e.g., In re Shull, 493 B.R. 453, 459 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2013) (finding that a 
security interest in fixtures granted to a home-mortgage lender constituted incidental 
property); In re Wissel, 619 B.R. 299, 317–18 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2020) (finding that 
improvements, easements, appurtenances, fixtures, escrow funds, replacements, and 
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 225. Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (citing Grubbs v. Hous. First Am. Sav. Ass’n., 730 F.2d 236, 245–46 (5th 
Cir. 1984)). 
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demand less restrictive covenants as to such use, and, ultimately, lower 
interest rates.226 
The ultimate beneficiaries of this effect are consumers who are able 
to borrow at lower cost, or, in some instances, to actually borrow. 
Because of the ability to, for example, rent out part of the mortgaged 
property without the fear of breaching the relevant loan covenants, 
borrowers are once again more likely to borrow because now they have 
an additional source of income available to help them with servicing 
their debt. 
Finally, this bright-line approach promotes efficiency and 
consistent application. Under the approach, there is no need to inquire 
into the notice of a lender of the mixed use by the borrower of the 
subject property. Even if the borrower, for example, rents out a portion 
of the property during the loan term, the anti-modification protection 
remains unaffected so long as the debtor uses the property as her 
principal residence. There is no need to argue over the relevant point in 
time at which the lender was supposedly put on notice either. Instead, 
the only determination a court must make is whether the property was 
actually being used by the debtor as her principal residence. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts should adopt the Mixed-Use Approach because it most 
faithfully reflects the statutory language. Under the approach, the anti-
modification provisions of the Bankruptcy Code prohibit a debtor from 
modifying a claim secured by a mortgage on real property so long as the 
 
 226. See In re Harriman, No. 12-49371, 2014 WL 1312103, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 31, 2014) (referring to the creditor’s statement that had it known of the debtor’s 
intention to use the subject property for a commercial purpose, it would have subjected 
the proposed transaction to a heightened review and scrutiny, and imposed on the 
transaction higher interest rate and additional loan covenants); Lomas Mortg., Inc. v. 
Louis, 82 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussing how allowing modification of multi-unit 
residential properties would tend to harm home owners in urban areas, where multi-unit 
housing is more common, while favoring those purchasing single-family homes, more 
common in suburban areas, because of the higher interest rates lenders would apply on 
multi-unit loans to compensate for the higher risk of modification); Utzman v. Suntrust 
Mortg., Inc., No. 15-CV-04299, 2016 WL 795739, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016) 
(“This bright-line approach also fosters certainty in the home lending market. 
Specifically, it counteracts the fear . . . that petitioners will sidestep the exemption by 
renting a portion of their property to another on the eve of their bankruptcy filing.”). 
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debtor actually uses the property as the debtor’s principal residence. 
Other simultaneous uses of the subject property, including income-
generating ones, are irrelevant. 
This conclusion is supported by the unambiguous text of 
the relevant statutory definitions. The definition of a debtor’s principal 
residence expressly provides that a principal residence can consist of 
both residential structure and incidental property. The accompanying 
definition of incidental property covers such items as rents, escrow 
funds, insurance proceeds, or mineral, oil, or gas rights or profits. 
It follows that debtors can actively proceed with renting a portion 
of their multi-unit dwellings in which they principally reside without 
compromising the principal-residence status of the property. Further, the 
overarching income-generating character of the definition of incidental 
property strongly suggests that debtors can generate income from or on 
their principal residences more generally—by, for example, running a 
home business. Moreover, the subject real property does not have to be 
the only collateral for the anti-modification protection to apply. It 
applies even if the underlying mortgage agreement covers collateral in 
addition to the “main” real property representing the debtor’s principal 
residence, so long as the additional property is of the kind listed in 
the definition of incidental property. This conclusion should apply 
irrespective of the characterization of the additional incidental-property 
items of collateral under the applicable non-bankruptcy law as either 
personal or real property. 
Finally, the adoption of the Mixed-Use Approach is further 
supported by the purpose of the anti-modification provisions of 
encouraging the flow of capital into the market with residential 
mortgages. The approach furthers that purpose by decreasing risk and 
costs to participants in residential mortgage transactions, and by 
promoting efficiency and consistent application. 
 
